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Abstract. We measure the extent to which the standard of proof the CPS must meet at trial in a 
child abuse or neglect case infl uences the outcomes in the case. In the United States, the government 
of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia sets its own standard of proof. We measure the 
infl uence of the standards of proof using survey data. We fi nd that a higher standard of proof – one 
requiring the government to present clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect rather than 
only requiring a preponderance of the evidence of abuse or neglect—decreases the probability that 
the judge rules in favor of CPS. A clear and convincing standard also affects decisions before trial: 
it increases the number of visits made by CPS during an investigation; it lowers the odds that CPS 
substantiates the case; and it lowers the odds that a case reaches trial. After trial, it increases the 
probability of an out-of-home placement.
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1. Introduction
A social worker engaged in child protective services (CPS) must navigate multiple 
contexts in addition to his or her own agency (Kearney, 2013). For example, to 
protect a child from immediate harm, a social worker often must work within the 
context of local law enforcement (Stroud and Warren-Adamson, 2013). This paper 
considers how the context of the legal system, including both the letter of the law 
and the way that social workers and other participants interpret the law, infl uences 
CPS decision-making. Studying how different legal systems infl uence CPS decision-
making is important to understanding the geographic variations in out-of-home 
placements and other CPS outcomes, both between and within countries.1 In the 
United States, which is our particular focus, the legal system that CPS workers must 
navigate varies across the individual U.S. states. This variation is similar to the way 
some aspects of the legal system vary across the United Kingdom.
In adversary legal systems such as the one in the U.S and other common law, 
British-infl uenced systems, one party bears the burden of proof in any legal case, 
including a case resulting from a CPS investigation. In order for that party to win, 
it must present a certain amount of evidence. If it fails to do so, then the other 
party to the case will win – even if that other party proves nothing. The law usually 
assigns the burden of proof to the party that has fi led a case or is seeking some type 
of relief. The law further assigns a standard of proof, which defi nes the strength of 
evidence that must be provided by the party bearing the burden of proof.2 In the 
United States, it is the legislature and the courts in each of the 50 states (plus the 
District of Columbia) that set the standard of proof in civil child abuse and neglect 
cases fi led by state CPS agencies. This paper investigates whether the standard of 
proof required by states at adjudication of child abuse or neglect has any infl uence 
on the decisions made about the case at adjudication, as well as at key junctures 
before and after adjudication.
1.2 Standards of proof generally
The standard of proof serves 
to instruct the factfi nder [judge or jury] concerning the degree of confi dence our 
society thinks he should have in the correctness of actual conclusions for a particular 
type of adjudication. (In re Winship, 1970, p. 370)
Put another way by the U.S. Supreme Court, a standard of proof 
serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative 
importance attached to the ultimate decision. (Addington, 1979, p. 423)
This purpose is illustrated in the justifi cations for the most well-known standard 
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of proof – the requirement that a criminal conviction be based on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This high standard refl ects society’s desire to provide a powerful 
protection to individuals facing deprivations of their physical liberty by the state. As 
the price of this protection, the law accepts that some guilty individuals will escape 
conviction. As the 18th century British scholar William Blackstone wrote, ‘It is better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer’ (Blackstone, 1892, p. 
713). Benjamin Franklin increased the ratio tenfold, writing ‘it is better 100 guilty 
Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer’ (Franklin, 1970, 
p. 293). These justifi cations admit that errors are inherent in any legal system, and 
they view a standard of proof as determining whether any side in a dispute should 
bear a greater part of the risk of error (In re Winship, 1970).
There are three primary standards of proof for trial decisions. The highest standard 
is beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires ‘being fi rmly convinced’ that something 
occurred, and also requires the absence of ‘a real possibility’ that it did not occur’ 
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 2001, p. 584). The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is 
applied in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases. The lowest standard of proof 
is preponderance of the evidence, defi ned as the ‘greater weight of the evidence’ 
which may be ‘slight’ and which need not be ‘suffi cient to free the mind wholly from 
all reasonable doubt’ (Black’s, 2001, p. 547). This standard applies when ‘society 
has a minimal concern with the outcome,’ such as a ‘typical civil case involving a 
monetary dispute between private parties’ (Addington, 1979, p. 423). For example, 
the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in suits for negligence following 
a car crash or for medical malpractice after an injury suffered following a surgery. The 
intermediate standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, defi ned as ‘evidence 
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain’ (Black’s, 
2001, 250). This standard is applied in civil cases with ‘interests at stake ... deemed 
to be more substantial than mere loss of money’ (Addington, 1979, p. 425).
Although the standard of proof that applies to most cases is well-settled, the 
determination of the standard of proof does occasionally create a legal dispute, especially 
when the state intervenes in the constitutional right to liberty outside of a criminal case. 
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
must apply in juvenile delinquency cases – which are nominally civil but bear many 
similarities to adult criminal cases (In re Winship, 1970). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has also held that the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence applies 
to involuntary civil commitments of adults to mental institutions (Addington, 1979), 
permanent termination of parental rights regarding a child (Santosky, 1982), and 
deportation orders (Woodby, 1966). The types of cases in which a clear and convincing 
standard applies have two themes in common. First, they pit the state, with its signifi cant 
law enforcement and litigation resources, against an individual. Second, they threaten 
to infringe upon a fundamental constitutional right (such as the right to physical liberty 
or family integrity) or impose a ‘drastic deprivation’ (such as deportation, Woodby, 
1966, p. 284). When less important rights are at stake, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
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approved the preponderance of the evidence standard; for instance, the Court approved 
a preponderance of the evidence standard in parentage proceedings designed to force 
non-custodial fathers to pay child support, noting that parents have no constitutional 
right to avoid paying child support (Rivera, 1987).
The text of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the standard of proof 
refl ect some ambivalence about whether the Court expected the choice between clear 
and convincing evidence and either alternative to have much practical difference, at 
least in jury trials. In Addington v. Texas (1979, pp. 424-425), in which the Court 
required a clear and convincing evidence standard rather than a preponderance of 
the evidence standard in civil commitment cases, it wrote:
Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what lay jurors understand 
concerning the differences among these three tests or the nuances of a judge’s 
instructions on the law may well be largely an academic exercise; there are no directly 
relevant empirical studies. Indeed, the ultimate truth as to how the standards of proof 
affect decisionmaking may well be unknowable, given that factfi nding is a process 
shared by countless thousands of individuals throughout the country. We probably 
can assume no more than that the difference between a preponderance of the evidence 
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is better understood than either of them 
in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The Court thus implicitly invited study to determine if setting a standard of proof 
is ‘more than an empty semantic exercise (Addingson, 1979, p. 425).’ We take up 
their invitation through the study of standards of proof at the adjudication of cases 
of child abuse and neglect.
1.3 Child protection cases and standards of proof
Again, in the United States, state rather than federal law governs individual child 
abuse and neglect cases, which are fi led by state CPS agencies in state courts.3 This 
devolution to the state level differs from the centralized systems of some countries 
but is similar to the United Kingdom, which devolves certain authority to England, 
Wales, and Scotland. The issues addressed here have broad implications for both 
nations with decentralized systems and for understanding differences across 
international lines. Moreover, while we focus on child abuse and neglect and out-of-
home placement decisions, the implications of our research extend to other issues 
in social work, such as domestic violence and juvenile delinquency, as well as to 
the understanding standards of proof broadly.
In all 50 states and the District of Columbia the sequence pictured in fi gure 1 
is followed, namely:
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Figure 1
Expected impact of the standard of proof on case outcomes
Note: A higher standard of proof is expected to have a direct effect, reducing the probability 
of adjudication of abuse and neglect (solid arrow).  Shadow effects (dashed arrows) may be 
negative (-), positive (+), indeterminate (?).
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1. CPS receives a report alleging that a parent has abused or neglected a child and 
decides whether or not to investigate the allegation. CPS must also decide how 
many resources to devote to investigation, including how many visits to make 
during the investigation.
2. CPS makes an administrative determination as to whether the parent has abused 
or neglected the child. A positive determination is called ‘substantiationæ‘ of 
the allegation.
3. If the allegation is substantiated, CPS decides whether to fi le a court case 
charging abuse or neglect. Filing a case typically coincides with a decision to 
remove children from their homes and place them temporarily in foster care.
4. After CPS fi les a court case, one of several options occurs: CPS may dismiss the 
case before it reaches trial; a parent may admit to the abuse or neglect (essentially, 
pleading guilty); or the case may proceed to a trial, at which a judge decides 
whether the state has proven that the parent abused or neglected the child. The 
standard of proof determines how robust the evidence must be for adjudication 
in favor of the state.
5. After an adjudication in favor of the state, the judge decides the disposition of 
the case, that is, whether the child should remain (or return) home with some 
sort of CPS oversight, or whether the child should be placed in long term foster 
care.
As the party taking action to intervene in a family, CPS bears the burden of proof 
at each of these stages, but the standard of proof may vary across the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia from one stage to another. At the fi rst stage, state statutes 
differ regarding the levels of certainty under which mandatory reporters (such as 
doctors or teachers) must report possible child abuse or neglect to child protection 
authorities; some states trigger that obligation when reporters have cause to believe 
that abuse or neglect occurred while others require reasonable suspicion before 
reporters must call CPS (Levi & Portwood, 2011). At the second stage, CPS must 
meet a standard of proof before they substantiate an allegation of abuse or neglect.4 
The standard varies from credible evidence or probable cause in some states to 
preponderance of the evidence in others (Levine, 1998).
At the fourth stage, CPS must prove to a judge that a parent has abused or neglected 
a child. The standard of proof for adjudication of abuse or neglect is a preponderance 
of the evidence in 32 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,5 but it is 
clear and convincing evidence in 18 states.6 As noted above, a judicial adjudication 
that a parent has abused or neglected a child subjects the child and parent to 
ongoing court jurisdiction (it is sometimes called the ‘ jurisdictional hearing’). It also 
empowers the judge to decide what disposition serves the child’s best interests; that 
is, the judge decides whether the child should return home under court or agency 
supervision or live in foster care.7
Again, this study focuses on the effects of the different standards of proof applied 
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by states at stage 4, the judicial adjudication of abuse or neglect. As discussed 
above, the different standards of proof at this stage refl ect different legal and policy 
judgments in each state regarding how to balance the competing interests at stake 
in these cases – respecting parents’ and children’s right to family integrity while 
also protecting children from potential harm caused by parental abuse or neglect. 
A clear and convincing standard of proof suggests that the state strikes this balance 
closer to the former concern because the right to family integrity is important and 
worthy of strong legal protections, to minimize the risk of fi nding abuse or neglect 
based on isolated behaviors, and to protect children and parents from unjustifi ed 
removals of children from parental custody (for example, In re M.L.C (2001) and In 
the interest of Dimmett (1977)). A preponderance of the evidence standard suggests 
that the state strikes this balance closer to the latter. Courts approving this standard 
have noted that wrongfully ruling that abuse or neglect did not occur would leave 
children living with unfi t parents and at risk of future neglect. Moreover, a ruling 
in favor of the state would only authorize a temporary invasion into the family – 
compared with the permanent severing of a parent-child relationship at issue in a 
termination of parental rights case (for example, In re Tammie Z. (1985) and In re 
N.H. (1990)).
Commentators are split regarding the most appropriate standard to apply 
(McMahon, 1999; Mandel, 2006). We take no position here regarding whether the 
clear and convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence standard should 
apply in child abuse and neglect cases. Rather, this study seeks only to determine 
whether different standards of proof matter in the sense that they have real infl uence 
on the outcomes child welfare court cases, on decisions about the disposition of 
the case subsequent to the court’s fi ndings, or on administrative decisions leading 
up to a court case.
What infl uence might the standard of proof at adjudication have? The standard 
of proof should directly affect the outcome of the court case at stage 4 in fi gure 1. A 
higher standard of proof should reduce the probability that a judge fi nds that abuse 
or neglect occurred. In formal legal terms, a higher standard of proof reduces the 
probability of adjudication of abuse and neglect. This direct effect is illustrated by 
the solid red block arrow on the right-hand side of fi gure 1.
Legal theory also suggests that the standard of proof will affect decisions leading 
up to a trial, because such decisions are made ‘in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin 
& Kornhauser, 1979). The higher the standard of proof at the end stage, the more 
cautious one would expect CPS to be along the way by dismissing more cases 
pre-trial, fi ling fewer cases at all, and/or substantiating fewer allegations of child 
abuse or neglect. Moreover, a high standard of proof may also have an effect on 
the disposition of a case: in states with a higher standard of proof, judges may be 
more willing to order long-term foster care because they are more certain abuse or 
neglect occurred. These possible shadow effects are illustrated by the dashed block 
arrows in fi gure 1. The expected sign of the effect of a higher standard of proof on 
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the probability of a positive decision at each stage is shown inside the arrow.
The standard of proof should affect the state’s incentives to gather evidence at 
the fi rst stage, but here the sign of the effect is not predictable and is illustrated 
in fi gure 1 with a question mark (‘?’) in the top-most arrow. A higher standard of 
proof is expected to increase the incentive for state agencies and lawyers to gather 
evidence to ensure that the state can meet its standard of proof. This may lead CPS 
to make more visits during an investigation. However, if the standard of proof is 
so high that CPS does not believe they can meet it, a higher standard might reduce 
incentive to gather evidence at all (Stephenson, 2011).
Additionally, the infl uence of the burden of proof on outcomes may be different 
for different types of allegations under investigation by CPS. For example, sex abuse 
charges are very diffi cult to prove because there is often no physical evidence; 
therefore, a higher burden of proof may reduce the likelihood that CPS fi les and 
prosecutes sex abuse cases. For this reason, it is desirable to estimate the impact of 
the standard of proof using case-level data, as we do below.
1.4 Prior Empirical Research
To our knowledge, our study is the fi rst to consider the real-world effects of 
preponderance of the evidence versus clear and convincing evidence standards of 
proof on adjudication of cases fi led by the CPS.
Standards of proof mainly have been studied in mock jury trial settings, and 
these studies’ inconsistent results suggest that the effect of standards of proof is 
not obvious. Mock jurors found for the plaintiffs more frequently when applying 
a lower standard of proof to the plaintiffs’ argument, but the size and statistical 
signifi cance of the differences in outcomes depended on the instructions given to the 
jurors (Schwartz & Seaman, 2013; Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985; Solan, 1999). Results 
regarding punitive damages in civil cases were less statistically robust than results 
in criminal matters (Woody & Greene, 2012). In child abuse and neglect cases, 
however, the fact-fi nder is a judge and the standard of proof can be assumed to be 
well-understood (for studies of judge versus jury see, Moore, 2000, and Clemant & 
Eisenberg, 1992). CPS lawyers who decide whether to fi le and prosecute cases can 
also be assumed to understand the law.
Most studies of legal outcomes for children with CPS contact do not include 
standards of proof as a covariate. As a recent meta-study on the determinants of 
out-of-home placement shows, many studies are for a limited geographical area and 
therefore the investigators do not observe variation in legal variables (Bhatti-Sinclair 
& Sutcliffe, 2013). But even national studies of the determinants of substantiation and 
out-of home-placements using administrative data or probability samples (Meyer, et 
al., 2010) do not include differences in legal systems or standards. The two studies 
we located that look specifi cally at decisions of judges do not discuss evidentiary 
ASHLEY J. PROVENCHER, JOSH GUPTA-KAGAN AND MARY ESCHELBACH HANSEN
30
standards (Ben-David, 2011; Britner & Mossler, 2002). The single identifi ed study 
of the evaluation of evidence by caseworkers discusses varying standards of proof 
but does not include it in the analysis (Cross & Casanueva, 2009).
Two studies of the child welfare system use state-level cross sections to consider 
the effect of different standards of proof for administrative substantiations (stage 
2 in fi gure 1). They fi nd that states with higher standards of proof had lower 
substantiation rates, as we would also predict, but the differences were small and not 
statistically signifi cant, again suggesting that the impact of standards of proof is not 
obvious (Levine, 1998, Flango, 1991). Flango (1991) found that little if any difference 
existed between substantiation rates across different categories of maltreatment: 
Substantiation in hard-to-prove categories such as emotional maltreatment did not 
differ in substantiation rates from easier-to-prove categories. Note, however, that 
the standard of proof at the substantiation stage may be, and often is, different from 
the standard of proof at the adjudication stage. Here we focus only on the standard 
at adjudication.
2. Data
We use the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-being (NSCAW). NSCAW 
is a rich source of child-level data that allows for the inclusion of control variables 
that have the potential to affect the outcome of the case. Moreover, the eight states 
identifi able in NSCAW data contain two that have a clear and convincing standard 
of proof at adjudication and six that have a preponderance of the evidence standard.
2.1 NSCAW
NSCAW is a national probability sample of children who came into contact with state 
CPS agencies. 8 Children were eligible for sampling if they were the alleged victim in 
an incident of abuse or neglect, and the CPS investigation began between October 1, 
1999, and December 31, 2000. All children were younger than 15 years old at the 
close of an investigation. The baseline interviews were conducted between November 
1999 and April 2001; three waves of interviews were conducted approximately 12 
months, 18 months, and 36 months later. Data from later waves were used only to 
capture court proceedings and out-of-home placements.
The observations in NSCAW are drawn without replacement from a two-stage 
stratifi ed sample. At the fi rst stage, there are nine strata. The fi rst eight are the states 
with the largest number of CPS caseloads: California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The ninth stratum consists of the remaining 
states.9 Primary sampling units (PSUs) are selected from within these strata. In 
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most cases, PSUs correspond to a county or a group of adjacent counties. In more 
densely populated places, a PSU may be a single CPS agency.10 Because this paper 
is concerned with differences between states, we considered the subpopulations in 
strata composed of single states. Of these eight states:
• Pennsylvania and Ohio had a clear and convincing standard of proof at trial 
during the sample time frame. NSCAW contains 314 cases from Ohio and 300 
cases from Pennsylvania, representing about 8 percent (95 percent confi dence 
interval 5.7-10.1 percent) of the population of children who came into contact 
with CPS in those two states.
• The remaining states in the fi rst eight strata had a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof at trial. NSCAW contains 695 cases from California, 285 cases 
from Illinois, 298 cases from Florida, 336 cases from Michigan, 408 cases from 
New York, and 485 cases from Texas, representing about 40 percent (95 percent 
confi dence interval 33.1-45.8 percent) of the population of children who came 
into contact with CPS in those six states.
Because the NSCAW time frame is short and includes no states that made changes 
to their standard of proof at adjudication, we are constrained to cross-section 
regressions. We cannot use the panel techniques that might allow us to separate 
the impact of the standard of proof from other state-wide differences in policy or 
social work practice that might infl uence decisions at the key junctures illustrated in 
fi gure 1. This would tend to increase the standard errors of our estimates, making it 
unlikely that we can detect differences at standard levels of statistical signifi cance. 
The survey’s complex design may also tend to increase standard errors of estimates 
particularly for small subgroups of the sample. Finally, because the survey includes 
only eight identifi able states, readers should use caution in the extension of the 
fi ndings here to all states. Yet NSCAW is the only publicly available data set of which 
we are aware that allows us to observe so many junctures in the progression of a 
case, as well as characteristics of the child and the case.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics on the Outcomes of Interest
To simplify the exposition, we present descriptive statistics and regression results 
in the order that the decisions are made in the course of a case, following fi gure 1 
from top to bottom.
2.2.1. Number of visits during investigation
The number of visits by CPS during the course of an investigation was recorded at 
the second wave, about 12 months after the close of the investigation. (all defi nitions 
from appendices to NDCAN 2008). Agencies in New York and Illinois only reported 
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data for substantiated cases, which creates an upward bias in number of visits, so 
these two states are excluded from the analysis for this outcome. As shown in column 
1 of table 1, there were 2,012 valid observations in NSCAW from the six strata. (See 
Online Appendix table A1 for all population statistics.11) These observations represent 
about 914,000 children in the six states. The number of visits per investigation 
averaged 2.65, with a standard deviation of 2.47. Adjusting for sample weights, the 
estimated average number of visits per case is between 2.06 and 2.44 (95 percent 
confi dence interval).
2.2.2. Abuse or neglect was substantiated
To determine whether or not abuse or neglect was substantiated in a case, we 
use a derived variable in the NSCAW data set that indicated whether a case was 
either ‘substantiated,’ or ‘other than substantiated.’ Again we use the six-state 
sample because New York and Illinois only reported data for substantiated cases. 
Again referring to column 1 of table 1, 54 percent of sample children’s cases were 
substantiated; after using the sample weights to adjust for the survey structure, we 
estimate that between 25 and 37 percent of the population of cases in the six states 
were substantiated.
2.2.3. CPS fi led a court case after substantiation
As part of the second wave of NSCAW interviews, the caseworker was asked about 
the child’s experience in court since the date of contact with the CPS agency (or, 
if contact date was missing, since the report date). If the abuse or neglect was 
substantiated and an ‘adjudication/jurisdiction hearing’ was recorded in NSCAW, 
then we know that CPS decided to fi le a court case at stage 3 in fi gure 1. (Note 
that if CPS fi led a court case but dropped it before the adjudication hearing, the 
fi ling is not observed; therefore, we underestimate total cases fi led.) The estimation 
sample contains substantiated cases in the eight-state sample: 2,648 children (table 
1, column 2). CPS fi led a court case alleging abuse or neglect for 21 percent of the 
children in the sample, indicating that between 8 and 19 percent of substantiated 
cases in the eight states went to trial.
2.2.4. Adjudication in favor of the state
Unfortunately, NSCAW does not directly record whether the judge made a fi nding 
in favor of the state at stage 4 in fi gure 1. We construct a proxy for the judge’s 
decision that utilizes the information about the dates of hearings recorded in 
NSCAW. Our proxy equals zero if an adjudication trial is the last court appearance 
recorded. The absence of court appearances after an adjudication trial indicates 
that it is likely that the judge found in favor of the parent/defendant and the case 
was closed. Our proxy equals one if any court appearances are recorded at dates 
later than the adjudication trial. If the judge fi nds in favor of the state at trial, or 
if the parents admit to alleged abuse/neglect before the court, there will be one 
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
 (1) (2) (3)
 Six-State Eight-state Eight-state
 Sample Sample Sample
 Mean St. Mean St. Mean St.
 or % = 1 Dev. or % Dev. or % Dev.
Number of Visits by CPS 2.65 2.47 3.15 2.89 3.19 3.17
Substantiated 0.54
Reached Adj Trial 
   | Substantiation   0.21
Judge Found in Favor 
   of State | Adj. Trail     0.80
OOH Place. | Adj. Trial     0.67
State has C&C Standard 0.24  0.17   0.21
Sexual Abuse 0.14  0.14  0.10
Physical Abuse 0.34  0.31  0.29
Neglect 0.59  0.63  0.69
Child’s Age in Months 38.87 3.61 36.72 3.81 28.13 4.09
n/N 2,102 2,648 1,891
Description of table 1: Sample (unweighted) descriptive statistics of dependent variables and 
selected independent variables included in estimation of the results reported in table 2.  See 
sections 2.2 and 2.3 for further details.  See Online Appendix table A111 for a complete list 
and for population (weighted) statistics.
or more hearings after the adjudication trial at which, for example, the judge will 
make a ruling about whether the child will be placed in long-term foster care. The 
estimation sample includes 1,891 children whose cases reached an adjudication 
trial (table 1, column 3). We estimate that there was a fi nding for the state in 80 
percent of the cases for which an adjudication trial was recorded, indicating that 
between 58 and 83 percent of all fi ndings are made in favor of the state.
2.2.5. Child was in an out-of-home placement after an adjudication hearing.
If a child was observed to be in an out-of-home placement, conditional upon an 
adjudication hearing being recorded in NSCAW, then the child’s case reached the 
fi nal stage shown at the bottom of fi gure 1. The estimation sample for this fi nal 
stage contains 1,891 children, representing nearly 404,000 children. Sixty-seven 
percent of children were in out of home placements at this stage, indicating that 
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between 38 and 69 percent cases that reached adjudication trial resulted in out-of-
home placements.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Primary Independent Variable
The fraction of the sample cases that were conducted in states with a clear and 
convincing standard of proof varies between estimation samples. Twenty-four 
percent of cases in the six-state sample were in states with the higher standard of 
proof (table1, column 1); the 95 percent confi dence interval is (12, 22). Seventeen 
percent of the sample of substantiated cases were in states with the higher standard 
of proof; the population proportion is between 5 and 18 percent (table 1, column 
2). Twenty-one percent of the sample of cases that reached adjudication trial were 
in states with the higher standard (table 1, column 3).
2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables
We control for several characteristics of the child and the case. Table 1, and Online 
Appendix table A1 again show descriptive statistics for the three estimation samples.
2.4.1. Type of abuse/neglect.
As noted above, allegations of some types of abuse – sexual abuse in particular – 
are very hard to prove under any standard of proof. By comparison, evidence is 
more readily found in cases of physical abuse or neglect. We therefore expect cases 
involving allegations of sexual abuse to require more visits during an investigation, 
to be associated with lower probabilities of substantiation, reaching trial, and 
adjudications in favor of the state, and to be associated with a higher probability 
of out-of-home placement after adjudication. Because the infl uence of the standard 
of proof may vary by type of abuse, in our logistic regressions we included an 
interaction term between the type of abuse and the standard of proof at adjudication 
in the state.
Information about the type of abuse or neglect was collected from the caseworker 
at wave 1 of NSCAW: caseworkers were asked if the case involved sexual abuse, 
physical abuse, or neglect. Responses were not mutually exclusive: a case may 
involve more than one type of abuse or neglect. For the sample of children in the 
six strata where we can observe the state’s decision to substantiate (stage 2 in fi gure 
1), about 14 percent involve allegations of sexual abuse, implying that there was an 
allegation of sexual abuse of between nine and 16 percent of cases. The proportion 
of cases involving allegations of sexual abuse is about the same in the estimation 
sample for stage 3, which includes all eight identifi able states in NSCAW but 
includes only those children whose cases were substantiated. The weighting results 
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in a slightly wider 95 percent confi dence interval for the population. The proportion 
in the sample for the fi nal stages (children whose cases reached adjudication trial) is 
10 percent, implying that allegations of sexual abuse were made between two and 
10 percent of the time in the population.
Allegations of physical abuse and neglect are more common at every stage. In the 
six-strata sample, 34 percent of children’s cases involve allegations of abuse and 59 
percent involved allegations of neglect. The corresponding confi dence intervals are 
35 to 45 percent for allegations of physical abuse and 35 to 45 percent for allegations 
of neglect. In the eight-strata sample of substantiated cases, the proportion of 
the sample with allegations of physical abuse is 31 percent; the proportion with 
allegations of neglect is 63 percent. The confi dence intervals are 31 to 48 percent 
for allegations of physical abuse and 49 to 62 percent for allegations of neglect. In 
the sample of cases that reached adjudication trial, the proportion of the sample 
with allegations of physical abuse is 29 percent; the proportion with allegations of 
neglect is 69 percent. The confi dence intervals are 23 to 53 percent for allegations 
of physical abuse and 46 to 82 percent for allegations of neglect.
2.4.2. Characteristics of the child.
We controlled for the race, ethnicity, and age of the child. Race was described with 
the mutually exclusive categories ‘White,’ ‘Black,’ and ‘Other’ (These statistics are 
reported in full in Online Appendix table A1). In the six-state estimation sample, 
30 percent of children are Black; the estimated population mean is 26 percent. 
In the eight-state estimation sample of substantiated cases, the proportion of the 
sample children who are black is 34 percent. In the estimation sample of cases that 
reached trial (column 3) 36 percent of children are Black. While the proportion of 
the sample children that is Black increases as we consider cases at later stages, the 
confi dence intervals overlap substantially.
The race of six to seven percent of children in each of the estimation samples is 
listed as ‘Other.’ These include multiracial children, and children identifi ed as Native 
American (about 6 percent after weighting) and Asian (2 percent). From 23 to 26 
percent of children are identifi ed as Hispanic; the confi dence intervals are wide.
In the six-state estimation sample, the average age of children in the sample 
is 39 months (standard deviation of 3.61 months), but younger children are 
overrepresented in the sample, so the estimated average age of the corresponding 
population is between 63 and 70 months. The average age of the children in the 
eight-state estimation sample of substantiated cases is almost 37 months, and 
the population average confi dence interval is between 55 and 67 months. In the 
estimation sample of cases that reached adjudication, the average age of children in 
the estimation sample is 28 months, and the population mean is between 34 and 
52 months
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2.4.3. Contacts during investigation.
The source of the information collected during investigation may infl uence outcomes 
(Zuravin, Watson & Ehrenschaft, 1987). Some sources, including medical personnel 
and foster parents, may have better knowledge about evidence or better access to 
collect evidence. Alternatively, some sources of information, such as teachers, may 
be viewed as more credible.
NSCAW records who was contacted during an investigation in data collected 
from caseworkers at wave 2 (NDACAN, 2008, p. II-E-12). Contacts recorded include 
the parent or guardian of the child, the foster parent, another relative of the child, 
teachers, doctors, and others. For this category of control variables, there is little 
variation in sample proportions across estimation samples: parents/guardians were 
contacted in 90 to 94 percent of cases in each estimation sample; foster parents 
were contacted in from 4 to 10 percent of sample cases; other relatives were 
contacted from 50 to 58 percent of sample cases; teachers were contacted in 25 to 
32 percent of cases, and ‘others’ were contacted in about 49 to 55 percent of cases. 
The proportion of cases in which doctors were contacted had the greatest variation 
between estimation samples, from 33 to 47 percent, but again the confi dence intervals 
overlap substantially.
2.4.4. Investigator.
The knowledge, access, or credibility of the investigator may also infl uence the 
outcome of the case. The type of investigator(s) recorded are not mutually exclusive 
and included CPS caseworkers, police, and ‘others,’ and the information was collected 
from caseworkers at wave 2 (NDACAN, 2008, II-E-12). Nearly all cases involved 
social workers, so that category is excluded. We expect that investigations conducted 
by CPS (or other child welfare workers) and police offi cials are more likely to move 
forward at each stage. In the samples, the proportion of investigations that involved 
police ranged from 27 to 33 (with overlapping confi dence intervals) percent, and 
the proportion of investigations that involved ‘others’ ranged from just fi ve to seven 
percent.
2.4.5. Number of visits.
This variable is an outcome of interest in the fi rst stage of fi gure 1, and it is included 
as a control in the analysis of subsequent states. We expect a larger number of 
visits made during the investigation to increase the amount or quality of evidence 
and therefore to be positively associated with a case moving forwards at each 
adjudication. We allowed for the possibility of non-linearity by including the square 
of the number of visits.
As noted above, the six-state sample has a mean of 2.64 visits per case. In 
the eight-state sample estimation sample used for estimation of reaching an 
adjudication trial, the mean number of visits per case is 3.15 (with standard 
deviation of 2.89); the 95 percent confi dence interval for the population mean is 
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(2.49, 3.01) . For the sample of cases that reached adjudication trial, the sample 
mean of number of visits is 3.16 (standard deviation of 3.17); the estimated 
population average is 2.97.
2.4.6. Multiple contacts with CPS.
We considered two measures of whether the child had multiple contacts with 
CPS. We expect new reports to decrease the scrutiny of the current report and to 
decrease the probability that a case based on the current report moves forward at 
each stage of fi gure 1, as the focus would likely move to the new report. NSCAW 
asks caseworkers whether a new report was opened for the sampled child between 
the time of the initial report and the close of the case (NDACAN, 2008, p. II-I-16). 
The percent of sample cases with new cases opened ranged from 27 to 33 percent, 
again with no statistically signifi cant difference between estimation samples.
We expect past contacts with CPS to increase scrutiny of the child’s situation 
and to increase the probability that a case moves forward at each stage. NSCAW 
asks the caseworker whether there was any previous substantiated report of abuse 
or neglect of the child (NDACAN, 2008, p.II-I-128).
Children with past substantiations ranged from 30 to 47 percent. The confi dence 
intervals between the six-state and eight-state substantiated sample barely overlap, 
but there is no statistically signifi cant difference between the eight-state samples 
of cases that were substantiated and reached adjudication trial.
Finally, in our estimation of the infl uences on the number of visits during the 
investigation, we also control for whether the child was ever placed in emergency 
care. Emergency care may increase the number of visits. Thirty-three percent 
(confi dence interval 14-24 percent) were ever placed in emergency care
3. Results
Table 2 overleaf shows our main regression results; complete results appear in Online 
Appendix A2. In the fi rst column are coeffi cients and t-statistics from a Poisson 
regression that estimates the impact of the standard of proof at adjudication on the 
number of visits made by CPS during an investigation. In columns 2-5 are odds 
ratios and t-statistics from the logistic regressions on the probabilities of cases being 
substantiated, reaching an adjudication trial, being adjudicated in favor of the state, 
and resulting in a long-term out-of-home placement.
The main effect of a state’s having a clear and convincing standard has the 
predicted sign in each regression. The main effect of having a standard of clear and 
convincing evidence:
• increases the number of visits during an investigation,
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• lowers the odds of substantiation,
• lowers the odds that the case reaches adjudication trial (conditional upon the 
case being substantiated),
• lowers the odds of adjudication in favor of the state (conditional upon the case 
having reached trial), and
• increases the odds of an out-of-home placement (conditional upon the case 
reaching trial).
As noted in section 2.1 above, the regressions have low power, and the main effect 
of a higher standard of proof is not statistically signifi cant at a level of 10 percent 
or better in any regression. However, in the logistic regression for stage 4, which 
measures the impact of the standard of proof on the outcome of the trial, the main 
effect is statistically signifi cant at the 13 percent level.
The impact of the type of abuse depends on the stage. An allegation of sexual abuse 
is associated with slightly more visits during an investigation, a lower probability 
of substantiation and of reaching an adjudication trial, but a higher probability of 
adjudication in favor of the state and out-of-home placement. An allegation of physical 
abuse is associated with slightly fewer visits, a higher probability of substantiation, 
and a lower probability of reaching trial, adjudication in favor of the state, and out-
of home placement. An allegation of neglect is associated with more visits during 
an investigation on average (the only statistically signifi cant effect among the main 
effects of type of abuse), a higher probability of substantiation and reaching trial, 
a lower probability of adjudication in favor of the state, and a higher probability of 
out-of-home placement.
We expected that case outcomes would be correlated with age in a non-linear 
fashion; a logarithmic specifi cation fi t the data best. We expected that younger 
children would receive more conservative treatment at each stage, and (although 
only statistically signifi cant in one specifi cation in table 2), cases involving infants 
have more caseworker visits and are more likely to be substantiated and reach an 
adjudication trial. Cases involving infants are, however, less likely to be adjudicated 
in favor of the state or result in an out-of-home placement.
Because allegations of sexual abuse may be diffi cult to prove, at least relative 
to allegations of physical abuse or neglect, the impact of having a clear and 
convincing standard of proof might depend upon the type of abuse. Therefore, our 
specifi cations include an interaction between the state’s standard of proof and the 
type of abuse alleged in the report; all of the interaction terms in the specifi cation 
for stage 4, adjudication in favor of the state, are statistically signifi cant. The 
full impact (that is, including the contributions of both the main effect and the 
interactions) of a higher standard of proof on each outcome, by type of abuse 
and age of child is illustrated in Figures 2 through 6. The predicted probabilities 
shown in the fi gures are calculated with all other control variables held at their 
medians.
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Table 2
Abridged regression results: The impact of a clear and convincing standard of proof
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
    Adj in 
   Reached Favor of Out-of-home
 Number Substan- Adj Trial State Place.
 of Visits -tiated | Subst. | Adj Trial | Adj Trial
 Coef. OR OR OR OR
State Has C&C Standard 0.11 0.79 0.61 0.11 1.64
 0.64 -0.30 -0.73 -1.57 0.32
     
Sexual Abuse 0.06 0.82 0.29*** 48.21*** 5.37**
 0.66 -0.49 -3.96 2.72 2.04
     
Physical Abuse -0.02 1.31 0.86 0.91 0.55
 -0.27 1.11 -0.45 -0.18 -0.88
     
Neglect 0.19*** 1.02 1.34 0.62 1.27
 3.48 0.08 0.56 -0.76 0.39
     
C&C * Sexual Abuse -0.17 0.88 34.05*** 0.02*** 0.02**
 -0.76 -0.14 3.12 -2.37 -2.32
     
C&C * Physical Abuse 0.08 0.85 1.19 16.54* 2.04
 0.74 -0.21 0.29 1.95 0.42
     
C&C * Neglect -0.12 1.59 0.95 10.20** 0.83
 -0.71 1.06 -0.06 2.07 -0.11
     
ln (Child’s Age in Months) -0.02 0.86 0.74*** 1.17 1.05
 -0.77 -1.50 -2.85 0.69 0.27
Sample n a 2,102 2,102 2,648 1,891 1,891
F 5.40 3.67 8.94 6.81 4.19
Notes:
*Indicates p<0.10, ** indicates p<0.05, ***indicates p<0.01; t-statistics in italics.
a IL and NY are omitted from Substantiation regressions because substantiation was a 
condition of children’s entry into sample.
See Online Appendix table A211 for complete results.
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Figure 2 illustrates that, for each type of alleged abuse, the total effect of the 
standard of proof and its interaction with type of abuse and neglect predicts 
more visits per case. Moreover, cases of alleged neglect in states with a clear and 
convincing standard of proof received the most visits during an investigation, 
while cases of alleged physical abuse in states with a preponderance of the 
evidence standard received the fewest visits.
Figure 3 shows that if the trial standard of proof is ‘clear and convincing,’ 
administrative substantiation is less likely for each type of abuse or neglect, even 
though the interaction term between clear and convincing standard and alleged 
neglect increases the odds of substantiation. For cases alleging physical abuse or 
neglect, the difference in the predicted probability of substantiation is about 5 
percentage points, which means that substantiation could be up to 25 percent 
more likely in states with a lower standard of proof than in a state with a higher 
one. We note again, however, that we are unable to detect statistical signifi cance.
Figure 4 shows that the probability of reaching an adjudication trial for a 
case involving alleged physical abuse or neglect is many times higher than for 
allegations of sexual abuse. Cases in states with a higher standard of proof have 
lower predicted difference in probabilities of reaching trial. The difference is 
negligible for alleged sexual abuse, but for alleged physical abuse or neglect 
reaching trial is on average about 5 percentage points (here 50 percent) more 
likely in states with the lower standard of proof. For an infant, the probability that 
the case reaches trial after an allegation of neglect is about 0.41 if the standard of 
proof is preponderance of the evidence; the probability is .32 if the standard is 
clear and convincing. For a 48-month old child in a neglect case, the predicted 
probability of the case reaching trial is about 0.15 with the lower standard and 
about 0.11 with a higher standard.
Figure 5 shows the results that are central to the argument of this paper: A 
higher standard of proof results in a lower probability of adjudication in favor of 
the state. Again the difference between high and low standards of proof is quite 
small for cases involving sexual abuse. Nearly all cases involving alleged sexual 
abuse that make it to trial are adjudicated in favor of the state no matter what 
the standard of proof. But the effect of higher standards is quite large for physical 
abuse and neglect. For a one year old, the probability of adjudication in favor 
of the state after an allegation of neglect is about 0.81 if the standard of proof is 
preponderance of the evidence; the probability is 0.40 if the standard is clear and 
convincing. For a 48-month-old child in a neglect case, the predicted probability 
of CPS fi ling a court case is about 0.88 with the lower standard and about 0.44 
with a higher standard. Averaging across all ages of children in neglect cases, the 
predicted probability of an adjudication in favor of the state is 90 percent higher 
in states with the lower standard of proof. For physical abuse cases, the pattern 
is similar, but the differences are smaller in size. Averaging across all ages, the 
predicted probability of adjudication in favor of the state in physical abuse cases 
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is 65 percent higher in states with the lower standard.
Figure 5 shows large differences in out-of-home placements by standard 
of proof for all types of abuse and neglect. Children in states with a clear and 
convincing standard of proof at adjudication are more likely to be in out-of-home 
placements after their cases are adjudicated. For sexual abuse the probability of 
placement in long-term foster care after an adjudication trial is about 0.9 in states 
with the higher standard, while the probability is about .66 in states with the 
lower standard. For neglect, the probability of long term placement is about .75 
after an adjudication trial in states with the higher standard, but .35 in states with 
the lower standard. For physical abuse, placement rates are just over 0.6 if the 
standard of proof is higher, and just over 0.2 if they are lower. Once again we must 
caution that the variation in outcomes is large, while the measurable variation in 
the standard of proof is small, so the differences are not statistically signifi cant.
4. Discussion
4.1 Discussion of fi ndings on standards of proof
It is often said that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’ Despite our 
inability to separate out other state-specifi c policies and therefore our inability to 
detect a statistically signifi cant infl uence of the standard of proof with these data, 
the magnitude of the impact of a higher standard of proof on the movement of 
children through the child welfare system is large enough to warrant continued 
study. By controlling for case-specifi c characteristics, we are able to detect statistical 
signifi cance in important interaction terms, indicating that a child-level analysis 
that includes additional state controls or fi xed effects holds more promise than the 
aggregate approaches in prior work such as Levine (1998) and Flango (1991).
Our data also goes further than prior research in suggesting that the trial standard 
of proof may affect decision making both at trial and much earlier in the life of a CPS 
case. If supported by further research, this conclusion would demonstrate that CPS 
is sensitive to the trial standard of proof from the investigation of a maltreatment 
allegation through the decision whether to remove a child and petition a court case, 
and that the effect of the trial standard of proof has the potential to affect a large 
number of children, families, and CPS systems in ways that today are not fully 
appreciated. For example, our results suggest the possibility that the standard of 
proof affects decisions in thousands of cases annually. Consider how many children 
and families are affected by a difference in the probability of substantiation as small 
as fi ve percentage points. The 2012 NCANDS Child File shows that there were 
2,044,924 reports of alleged abuse or neglect in states with a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.12 Of these reports, 23 percent, or 470,562, were substantiated. 
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Our results suggest that if these states had the higher clear and convincing standard 
of proof, only 18 percent, or 368,315, cases might have been substantiated. In states 
with the lower standard of evidence, CPS systems had to make decisions about fi ling 
court cases for more than 100,000 more cases than they would have if the standard 
of proof were higher.
We note again that, while we do not take a position here on whether the standard 
of proof should be higher or lower, our fi ndings do imply that states should be more 
conscious of the costs and benefi ts of staking their own positions regarding the 
standard of proof. Continuing with the example from the previous paragraph: On 
one hand, since it is becoming clear that the substantiation is not a good measure 
of severity of current abuse or a strong predictor of future abuse (Drake et al., 2003; 
Hussey et al., 2005, Kohl et al., 2009) it is possible to argue that moving forward 
with the additional cases might better refl ect the high risks that children subject to 
CPS investigations face. On the other hand, one could argue that resources would 
be more effi ciently allocated by limiting the number of cases that move forward 
in the court system, unhitching the provision of services from the movement of 
cases from stage to stage, and providing effective services to families regardless of 
substantiation status.
Our fi ndings also raise the possibility that the standard of proof affects decisions 
after adjudication. Among cases that reach adjudication, a higher standard of proof 
correlates with increased odds of an out-of-home placement. Cases that reach this 
stage in states with higher standards of proof are likely to have a stronger evidence 
base and may be seen as being more serious cases. The higher standard of proof 
may focus out-of-home placements on cases involving children most in need of 
protection. Since children who are on the margin of placement and enter foster 
care have worse outcomes than similarly-maltreated children who CPS leaves at 
home (Doyle, 2011), it is not clear what the cost or benefi t of the higher standard 
might be. Perhaps the greater likelihood of post-adjudication out-of-home placement 
risks placing more children with marginal cases in out-of-home care. Or perhaps 
the higher standard of proof screens out the more marginal cases by reducing the 
odds of substantiation, court fi lings, and court adjudications. It is noteworthy that 
Doyle (2011) studied cases in Illinois, a state with a lower standard of proof. Thus 
the cases identifi ed as marginal cases for out-of-home placement in that study may 
not be marginal in states with higher standards of proof.
4.2 Discussion of fi ndings on other covariates
4.2.2 Child characteristics.
While race was not a focus of this study, we capture disproportionality in the data as 
an increasing share of Black children in the estimation samples for later stages of child 
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welfare decision-making, but early-stage outcomes are not statistically signifi cantly 
different for Black children as compared to White children. This is consistent 
with studies that report that there are more false positives for Black children than 
White children in initial reports (Mumpower, 2010). At fi nal stage of out-of-home 
placement, we do fi nd that outcomes for Black children are statistically different from 
outcomes for White children. However, while the literature on disproportionality 
might suggest that Black children have higher odds of placement after adjudication, 
we fi nd that Black children are less likely to be placed in long-term foster care, all 
other things equal. Our fi ndings are consistent with the view that the disproportional 
representation of Black children in foster care is driven by their longer stays in care 
(for a recent review of this literature, see Chibnall, Dutch, Jones-Harden, Brown, & 
Gourdine, 2010). Because children identifi ed as another race is a subgroup comprised 
of multi-racial children and children whose racial groups have very small numbers, 
we cannot form a story interpreting the coeffi cients.
The negative association between the age of the child and the probabilities of 
substantiation and of reaching an adjudication trial confi rms our expectation that 
the state acts most conservatively in the cases of the youngest children. In light of 
statistically strong results for the probability of reaching an adjudication trial, it is 
somewhat surprising that the probability of out-of-home placements is not higher 
for infants. Age of the victim, however, is seldom found to be a strong predictor of 
out-of-home placements (for example, Horwitz et al., 2011).
4.2.3. Contacts during investigation.
If an investigation involved a foster parent or a relative other than the parent or 
guardian, the case was more likely to be substantiated, reach trial, and be adjudicated 
in favor of the state. Most likely this refl ects an emergency foster care or kinships 
placement and is likely to be a signal of the caseworker’s initial opinion regarding 
the severity of abuse or neglect.
4.2.4. Investigator.
We expected that if police or other professionals assisted in the investigation, the 
evidence would be more credible and would result in a higher probability of a case 
moving forward at each stage. The results confi rm our expectations in four of the 
fi ve specifi cations in table 2. Puzzlingly, however, when police investigate, the case 
is less likely to be adjudicated in favor of the state. This fi nding warrants further 
investigation.
4.2.5. Multiple contacts with CPS.
When a new report is opened while an investigation is ongoing, it appears that 
the focus of CPS shifts to the new report. If, however, there had been a previous 
substantiated report of abuse or neglect of the child, the probabilities of substantiation, 
of reaching an adjudication trial, and of out-of-home placement after an adjudication 
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trial all increase. These results refl ect the fact that CPS uses the prior substantiation 
as information about the likelihood that the current report is accurate and serious. 
The use of the information may be informal (for example, the caseworker knows the 
family) or formal (for example, the risk assessment tool that is used factors in prior 
substantiation). But the previous substantiation negatively impacts adjudication in 
favor of the state.
4.3 Limitations
While NSCAW data are the only ones available for this type of case-level analysis, 
they are limited. The most obvious limitation stems from the survey design: only eight 
states are identifi able, and therefore the results reported may not be generalizable to 
other states. However, since these eight states have the largest child welfare systems, 
they are the most critical to study in terms of the number of families potentially 
affected.
The study also covers a short time frame. This presents two problems. First, 
because we do not observe complete case histories, we do not know if CPS fi led a 
case later and we do not necessarily observe all court appearances in a case. This 
shortcoming, however, would only result in bias if the duration of time between key 
junctures is itself a function of the standard of proof at adjudication. Since many 
states have timelines from when a case is fi led to when a trial is required, this seems 
unlikely. Additionally, it seems unlikely that idiosyncratic delays, such as whether 
there are continuances, are correlated with the burden of proof.
The second problem associated with the short time frame is our inability to use 
panel methods. We cannot include state effects, which would capture such omitted 
policy variables such as the presence of court mediation programs.
Finally, NSCAW does not record all of the legal decisions in the course of a case 
that we would include if we designed a study for the purpose of answering our 
research question. For example we do not observe an admission by a parent of abuse 
or neglect (akin to a guilty plea), nor do we observe a decision by the government to 
drop a case before it reaches trial. We cannot separate direct effect of the standard 
of proof on the judge’s decision from the shadow effect of the law on the parties’ 
private decision-making about plea bargains.
5. Conclusions and directions for further study
The presence of some statistically signifi cant effects from the interaction between 
abuse type and standard of proof in child welfare proceedings, together with the 
large point estimates of the effects, suggests that this area is ripe for further study. 
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Further study is likely have broad implications in the United States and in any legal 
system with analogous standards of proof for child abuse and neglect or other judicial 
and administrative decisions. Several specifi c areas warrant attention.
• First, additional research should address the standards of proof applied by CPS at 
substantiation (stage 2). These standards also vary from state to state within the 
United States. Unlike the standard of proof at court adjudication (the subject of 
the present study), these standards of proof have been changed in several states 
over the past decade, permitting before-and-after comparisons and the inclusion 
of state fi xed effects. In light of the growing literature that concludes that there 
is little difference in the risks to children in substantiated and unsubstantiated 
cases (Kohl et al. 2009; Drake, et al. 2003), a more detailed understanding of 
the infl uence of the standard of proof at substantiation could contribute to 
discussions of whether and how to reform that stage of child protection cases.
• Second, research should analyze the standards of proof at disposition – the 
stage of a case which follows a plea by a parent or an adjudication for the state. 
At this stage, the judge determines whether the child – who has been judged 
abused or neglected – should remain at home with a parent, live with another 
parent or family member, or live in foster care. Some U.S. states have established 
relatively high standards of proof at disposition. California, for instance, requires 
a preponderance of the evidence to prove that a parent abused or neglected 
his/her child (see Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 355, 2006), but requires clear and 
convincing evidence to prove that placing the child in foster care serves the 
child’s best interests (see Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 361(c), 2006).
• Third, future research should explore whether any connection exists between the 
standard of proof at trial and states’ use of alternative response (also known as 
differential response). In states that have adopted alternative response, CPS does 
not automatically investigate all screened-in allegations. Rather, relatively severe 
allegations trigger CPS investigations while relatively mild allegations trigger CPS 
or a contractor to assesses families’ service needs and offers voluntary services. 
Alternative response systems are relatively new innovations, and are far more 
common today than at the time the NSCAW data used here were collected, so 
we do not study them here.  Further research should investigate whether such 
an effect extends to the decision whether to assign a case to an investigation or 
alternative response track in those states which have created such a track.
• Research should address whether the standards of proof at substantiation, 
adjudication, and disposition operate as a package. A few states have the 
lowest standard of proof possible at all stages: they require probable cause to 
substantiate, preponderance of the evidence to fi nd a parent unfi t at adjudication, 
and preponderance of the evidence to place the child of a parent found unfi t 
in foster care. A few states have the highest standard of proof at all stages: they 
require a preponderance of the evidence to substantiate, clear and convincing 
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evidence to adjudicate, and clear and convincing evidence to place the child of 
an adjudicated parent into foster care. Many states fall in between – perhaps 
with a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for an administrative 
substantiation, adjudication, and disposition. Further study has the potential 
to reveal the extent to which any individual effects of these standards of proof 
or any particular package explain the variation in substantiation, out-of-home 
placement, service provision, and, of course, the mental health and physical 
health outcomes of children.
Notes
1 This problem highlights the importance of teaching law to CPS workers (Braye and 
Preston-Shoot 1990, Dickens 2004).
2 Although ‘burden of proof’ and ‘standard of proof’ are sometimes used interchangeably, 
we use ‘standard of proof’ to refer to the degree to which a party must prove its case 
(that is, by a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond 
a reasonable doubt).
3 In the United States, federal law requires states to abide by certain conditions in exchange 
for federal funding. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several decisions 
government child abuse and neglect cases. But no federal law or court decision directly 
governs the standard of proof at initial adjudications, and the standard of proof varies 
across the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
4 Some states now investigate only more severe allegations, and offer voluntary services 
without an investigation to families subject to less severe allegations. This triage 
procedure, known as differential response, was not prevalent at the time the data used 
here were collected.
5 Alaska Stat. § 47.10.011; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-844; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B); 
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 355 & 355.1; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-505(1); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 46b-129; In re Juv. App., 471 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1984); Del. Fam. Ct. Rules 
of Civ. Proc. 213(b); D.C. Code § 16-2317(b)(2); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.507(1)(b); Hawaii 
Rev. Stat. § 587A-4; Idaho Code § 16-1619(4); 705 Il. Code Serv. § 405/2-18(1); Ind. 
Code § 31-34-12-3; Kent. Rev. Stat. § 620.100; La. Ch. Code Art. 665; 22 Maine Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 4035(2); Md. Courts & Jud. Proc. § 3-817; Mich. Rules 3.972; Matter of 
Riffe, 382 N.W. 2d 842 (Mich. App. 1985); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-561; Mont. Code 
Ann. § 41-3-422(5)(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279.01; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.530; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. § 169-C:13; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.46; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1046(b); 10A Okl. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-4-602 & 1-3-603; Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.310; 8 L.P.R.A. § 447h; S.C. Code 
§ 63-7-1660; Tex. Fam. Code § 105.005; 33 Ver. Stat. Ann. § 5315; Va. Code Ann. §§ 
16.1-252 & 63.2-1525; Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130; Wyo. Stat. 1977 § 14-3-425.
6 Ala. Code §§ 12-15-310 & 12-15-311; Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-180; Iowa Code Ann. § 
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232.96; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2250; 119 In re Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087 (Mass. 1987); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260C.163; Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules of Juv. Proc. 124.06 Comment; In Interest 
of D.D.H., 875 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, § 32A-4-20(H); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-805; N.D. Code § 27-20-29; Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.35(A)
(1); 42 Pa. Code § 6341(c); R.I. R. Juv. Proc. 17; In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036, 1039 
(R.I. 1980); S.D. Code § 26-7A-82; Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129; Utah Code 1953 § 
78A-6-311; W. Va. Code § 49-6-2; Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 48.31.
7 If a child is removed from and does not reunify with a parent, the state may seek 
to terminate the parents’ rights or to place the child with a guardian. As a matter 
of constitutional law, the state must prove that a termination of parental rights is 
justifi ed by clear and convincing evidence (Santosky, 1982, p. 455). Standards of 
proof for establishing guardianships are typically lower. E.g. D.C. Code § 16-2388(f) 
(preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for guardianship).
8 We use only the ‘CPS’ sample in NSCAW. Children in the Long Term Foster Care Sample 
of the NSCAW are excluded because information about their initial adjudications and 
other experiences is not a part of NSCAW. Sample probability weights are included 
in model estimation to appropriately account for the survey structure and estimate 
standard errors. We also excluded the 73 children living in foster care at the start of 
the investigation from all calculations.
9 Four states were excluded from the NSCAW study because they have a state law that 
requires that the caregiver of any child selected for the study be fi rst contacted by the 
CPS agency staff rather than by NSCAW personnel. The target population subsequently 
is ‘all children in the U.S. who are subjects of child abuse or neglect investigations (or 
assessments) conducted by CPS and who live in states not requiring agency fi rst contact,’ 
(National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN), 2008, pp. 2-13).
10 For this analysis, small sample size prevents us from simultaneously controlling for a 
child’s state of residence and CPS agency.
11. Available at: http://academic2.american.edu/~mhansen/OnlineAppendix.pdf.
12 Authors’ calculations using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System 
(NCANDS) Child File, FFY 2012v1. 
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